
12 The Stereotypic Behaviors of the Powerful and Their Effect on the Relatively Powerless

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Power is often coveted, fought over, and fiercely protected. Some have suggested that power corrupts people (e.g., Lord Acton). Others have suggested that foolish people corrupt power (e.g., George Bernard Shaw). Regardless of whether power corrupts people or people corrupt power, inquiries typically have focused on who seeks and secures power over whom and with what adverse consequences.

Because power and social group membership historically have been and continue to be confounded in most societies, social scholars and commentators long have been interested in the potentially corruptive and status quo maintaining relation of power to stereotyping. In the United States, for instance, 36% of employed Whites are in management and professional positions, compared to only 26% of employed African Americans and 17% of Latinos. In addition, although women made up 46% of the U.S. labor force in 2004 and have higher salaries than in the past (e.g., women's median weekly earnings were a full 80% of men's; U.S. Department of Labor & Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005), gender equity is confined to middle management positions in feminized or gender-neutral domains. Striking gender disparities remain among the ranks of the powerful in traditionally masculine domains, where the attributes predictive of success are stereotypically associated with men but not women. For example, only 23% of the chief executives, 6% of construction managers, and 6% of engineering managers are women (U.S. Department of Labor & Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2005). Thus, White men are more likely to hold positions of power than are women and minorities. In addition, if power corrupts people or foolish people corrupt power, stereotypes may influence the judgments and behaviors of the powerful in ways that effectively reinforce and maintain the status quo (e.g., Fiske, 1993; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).

The goals of this chapter are twofold. First, we review prior theory and research on power and stereotyping to highlight core conceptualizations, foundational assumptions, classic findings, and the social contexts of interest. Our review and critique of prior theory and research, in the first half of this chapter, allows us to address a series of background questions. These include: What is power? Who traditionally has power? How does power shape thoughts and behaviors? How does power generally influence stereotyping and discrimination? Second, we present a broader theoretical perspective to elucidate both the causes and consequences of the stereotypic actions of powerful people. In the second half of the chapter, we link the basic human motives to belong and be legitimate to situations involving power differentials and note how this may shape the goals of high- and low-power people. After integrating considerations of basic human motives and situations with power differentials, we present theoretical propositions that provide the foundation for what we refer to as a goal-situated model of power and stereotyping.

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POWER

Power has traditionally, and most frequently, been defined in social influence terms. Like others, we define power as the ability to influence other people in psychologically meaningful ways (Copeland, 1994; French & Raven, 1959) through the giving or withholding of rewards and punishments (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). In this definition, psychologically meaningful influences include, but are not limited to, actions that affect the cognition, emotion, and behaviors of another. Importantly, dependence and power are inversely related (Emerson, 1964); those who depend on others for rewards and punishments are less powerful than those who do not. Of course, what constitutes a reward or punishment may vary across people in a given context or across contexts for a given person. Interpersonal pleasantries and incivilities, like praise or criticism, are sometimes meaningful rewards and punishments, as are the giving and withholding of limited resources like raises and demotions.

The social influence definition of power encompasses several kinds of power differentials. In fact, the definition includes four of the five types of power that French and Raven (1959) specified in their classic typology of power relations. We first define each of the four forms of power and then note their interrelations. First, *legitimate power* refers to influence associated with holding a position or role that confers authority and legitimates one's influence over another (e.g., the power bosses have over employees). Second, *reward power* refers to influence associated with distributing and withholding rewards (e.g., raises and promotions). Third, *punishment (or coercive) power* refers to influence associated with withholding or administering punishments (e.g., demotions or suspensions). Fourth, *informational power* refers to the influence associated with holding information needed or desired by another (e.g., the power of a car mechanic over a stranded driver). Interestingly, these four forms of power often co-occur. Professors, for instance, hold a role that legitimates and gives authority to their influence over students. They have achieved their role by obtaining information that students need to succeed (e.g., earning an advanced degree in a field of study) and they are expected to use their role to reward or punish students (e.g., with grades or assignments).

We refer to *role power* as the kind of power that combines legitimate power, reward power, punishment power, and informational power to create high power roles. High power roles, which are more likely to be held by White men than men who belong to ethnic minority groups or women of any ethnicity, legitimate one's influence over others by conferring on a person the right to give or withhold rewards and punishments and by formalizing his or her ability to convey important information.

Role power may be further exacerbated or attenuated by what French and Raven (1959) referred to as referent power. *Referent power* is the influence one has over others because of feelings of identification. Referent power is, for instance, the kind of influence that a cherished mentor has over the students, apprentices, or protégés who identify with and feel a sense of oneness with their teacher. Importantly, referent power is the only kind of power given up the hierarchy. Receiving referent power from a low-status person bestows one with an additional form of influence over and above the influence conferred by legitimate, reward, punishment, and informational power. Inversely, the impact that the behaviors of high-power people have on the self-concept of low-status people is minimized when low-power people withhold referent power by disidentifying with or devaluing a particular domain or a person of power (e.g., Steele & Aronson, 1995).

STEREOTYPING, POWER, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF THE STATUS QUO: PRIOR WORK

In this chapter, like others, we focus attention on situations where women and men of ethnic minority groups identify with stereotype-relevant domains, or domains where the attributes predictive of success are stereotypically associated with White men but not women or racial minorities (see also Steele & Aronson, 1995; Walton & Cohen, 2003, 2007). Traditionally valued achievement domains (e.g., science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, collectively referred to as STEM domains)

have been of interest to researchers because gender and racial disparities in representation, status, and performance are particularly pronounced in these domains. As a result, White men often hold positions that confer power and legitimate their influence over others, including women and ethnic minorities. To the degree that high-power people initiate interactions with low-power people on the basis of stereotypes, they may behave in ways that elicit stereotypic behaviors from others (e.g., Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974) and that reinforce existing power differentials (see, e.g., Fiske, 1993; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Pratto et al., 1994; Snyder & Miene, 1994).

Implicitly, power and stereotyping long have been assumed to be linked in status quo maintaining ways (e.g., Allport, 1954; Darley & Gross, 1983; Snyder et al., 1977; Tajfel, 1982; Word et al., 1974). The amassing body of contemporary literature on power and stereotyping, however, was inspired by Fiske's (1993) model of power as control. As a precursor to consideration of Fiske's theory and the research inspired by her work, we first note the commonalities across 1980s theories of stereotyping and contemporary prejudice. We then briefly review findings documenting the corruptive influences of power. Finally, we note how Fiske integrated those ideas and briefly review the body of literature inspired by her work. Findings in this literature suggest that powerful people often stereotype low-power people more strongly than the reverse. Importantly, however, powerful people do not stereotype uniformly. Stereotyping effects vary across situations and people. Thus, we conclude with a consideration of the situational factors and individual differences that influence stereotyping.

FOUNDATIONAL IDEAS OF RELEVANCE IN THE STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE LITERATURE

Often perceivers immediately and effortlessly categorize people, like objects, into groups (see Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). The categorization of others into meaningful social groups (e.g., on the basis of gender, race, or age) allows people to both simplify complex social stimuli (Allport, 1954; Tajfel, 1978) and apply stereotypic knowledge to make inferences that go beyond what could be known solely on the basis of the information available (Bruner, 1973).

In the 1980s, several theories of racial prejudice were introduced to explain the more subtle (post-civil rights movement) face of American prejudice (e.g., aversive racism, Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; ambivalent racism, Katz & Hass, 1988; modern or symbolic racism, Kinder & Sears, 1981; McConahay, 1982; McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981). Toward that end, each theory integrated the notion that people process social information in the least effortful manner possible (e.g., category-based) unless sufficiently motivated to do otherwise (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) with findings that White Americans' endorsement of blatant racist statements had sharply declined.

Although theories of contemporary racism differ in several important ways, the commonalities across theories are relevant to this chapter. First, each theory considers White-Black relations in America and suggests that, as a result of shared socialization experiences, most White Americans are aware of the historic and ongoing antipathy toward, discrimination against, and stereotypes of Black Americans. Second, the theories share an assumption that White Americans have unwittingly internalized the pervasive cultural stereotypes and feelings of antipathy toward Black Americans and that Whites' unacknowledged negativity can influence perceptions, judgment, and behavior. Third, although both high- and low prejudice-Whites have internalized negative cognitions and feelings about Blacks, high- and low-prejudice Whites were suggested to critically differ in their blatant attitudes and controlled responses toward Black Americans. Unlike high-prejudice people, low-prejudice people (aversive, ambivalent, or modern and symbolic racists) presumably endorse personal beliefs (e.g., Devine, 1989), have self-concepts (e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), or cherish values (like egalitarianism; e.g., Katz & Hass, 1988) that explicitly *reject* the negative cultural stereotypes of Black Americans. As a result, unlike high-prejudice people, low-prejudice people tend to monitor, control, and squelch their conscious expressions of prejudice when they become aware that stereotypes are affecting judgment (e.g., when there are strong cues about appropriate interracial behavior in the environment, see Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). However, both high-prejudice

and low-prejudice Americans were still thought to unwittingly stereotype and discriminate against Black Americans as a result of automatic and nonconscious processes.

FOUNDATIONAL IDEAS OF RELEVANCE IN THE POWER LITERATURE

As noted at the outset, the assumption central to theorizing and research on power is the notion that power corrupts (Kipnis, 1972). Powerful people may not intend to abuse power or be aware of the fact that they have been corrupted by power, but power has been assumed to exert a primarily corruptive influence. Consistent with this notion, findings show that elevations in power are related to increases in the frequency of aggressive behavior (e.g., Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973), the tendency to take credit for the contributions of subordinates (Kipnis, 1972), and the likelihood that low-power women will be sexualized (Bargh, Raymond, Pryor, & Strach, 1995).

The corruptive influences of power may stem from a more general tendency for power to disinhibit behavior (Keltner et al., 2003). Compared to low-power people, for instance, high-power people talk more, interrupt more, and speak out of turn more often (DePaulo & Friedman, 1998). High-power people are also more likely than are low-power people to tease others in aggressive ways (Keltner, Capps, Kring, Young, & Heerey, 2001), bully their romantic partners (Howard, Blumstein, & Schwartz, 1986), and construe others in ways that increase the likelihood of sexual harassment (Studd, 1996; see also Bargh et al., 1995). Power does not, however, simply lead to negative and socially inappropriate behavior. Instead, high-power people, compared to low-power people, may sometimes engage in more nonconventional *prosocial* behaviors (e.g., offering unsolicited help, expressing affection; Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; see also Keltner et al., 2001).

In other words, elevated power increases action, regardless of the particular actions available in a situation. Consistent with this idea, Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee (2003) found that high-power people were more likely than low-power people to remove an annoying stimulus from an environment and to act in risky manners (e.g., take a hit on 16 when playing poker). Galinsky et al. also found that powerful people were more likely to take from a common pool of resources when that was the action permitted in a situation. However, when the situation was altered such that the taking action involved donating to a common pool of resources, powerful people also contributed more to the common pool than did low-power people. Power, it seems, frees one from situational constraints (Overbeck, Tiedens, & Brion, 2006), such that high-power people act more (Galinsky et al., 2003) and behave more variably than do low-power people across situations as well as within situations (Guinote, 2001; Guinote, Judd, & Brauer, 2002).

CLASSIC THEORY AND RESEARCH ON POWER AND STEREOTYPING:

THE CONTEMPORARY STARTING POINT

The foregoing considerations point to core themes in the stereotyping and prejudice literature and the power literature. Theories of racial prejudice suggest that, unlike high-prejudice people, low-prejudice people inhibit discriminatory responding. Power is, however, inversely related to social inhibition; high-power people inhibit less and act more than do low-power people. Together, these ideas hint at the potentially problematic nature of the linkages between power and stereotyping.

First seeing the potentially problematic linkages between power and stereotyping, Fiske (1993) proposed that stereotyping should be stronger down than up the hierarchy. Consistent with the tenets of the broader models of impression formation (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) and dominant theories of prejudice (e.g., Devine, 1989; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Katz & Hass, 1988), Fiske assumed that people process information about others in the least effortful manner (e.g., category-based perception). Extending this logic to consider the strength of stereotyping effects in situations involving power differentials, Fiske reasoned that low-power people should be relatively motivated to go beyond categorical knowledge and individuate those who have control

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over them; by individuating powerful people, low-power people may increase perceptions of the degree that high-power people are predictable, thereby enhancing feelings of personal control. By contrast, high-power people should stereotype low-power people either because they lack the motivation or cognitive resources to individuate those over whom they have power (e.g., stereotyping by default) or because they are motivated to maintain power differentials (e.g., stereotyping by design; Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000).

Findings from several studies support the notion that stereotyping is often stronger down, rather than up, the hierarchy (Fiske, 1993). High- compared to low-power people pay more attention to and better remember stereotype-consistent information than stereotype-inconsistent information (Depret & Fiske, 1999; Goodwin et al., 2000; Rodríguez-Bailón, Moya, & Yzerbyt, 2000). In some situations, high-power people stereotype both high- and low-power others more than do low-power people, such that small, actual preexisting differences between high- and low-power people are exaggerated (Ebenbach & Keltner, 1998).

Automatic categorization and stereotyping processes are not, however, ubiquitous among people in general or high-power people in particular. Although several studies examined the core prediction forwarded by Fiske (1993)—that stereotyping was stronger down than up the hierarchy—Fiske also pointed to factors that should increase and decrease powerful people’s tendency to stereotype. For instance, Fiske noted that stereotyping among the powerful should be stronger in some situations than others (e.g., when environments are cognitively taxing or when high-power people are less dependent on others). Fiske also posited that stereotyping among the powerful might be particularly strong among people motivated to maintain power differentials, such as those high in dominance.

VARIABILITY IN STEREOTYPING AS A FUNCTION OF SITUATIONS

The socially meaningful groups to which people belong (e.g., gender of women and race of Blacks) may grab attention (Stroessner, 1996; Zarate & Smith, 1990) and set the stage for category-based perception (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). In addition, because stereotypes contain information about a group’s relative social status and explanations for that status (Eagly & Karau, 2002; Vescio & Biernat, 1999; Wittenbrink, Gist, & Hilton, 1997), stereotypes are relevant to a wide array of achievement domains.

Importantly, however, stereotypic knowledge influences perceptions of others only when that knowledge is relevant to both the interpretation of a particular behavior and a component of the cultural stereotypes of the group to which a person belongs (Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993). For instance, the construct “dependence” might be activated in a situation and lead an observer to conclude that a woman behaving in an ambiguously dependent way is extremely dependent. However, the same observer would not necessarily rate a similarly behaving man as dependent, nor would primed dependence influence the interpretation of a woman’s athletic behavior. Consistent with this notion, findings show that primed dependence influenced impressions of ambiguously dependent female (but not male) targets, whereas primed aggression affected appraisals of ambiguously aggressive male (but not female) targets (Banaji et al., 1993; see also Corneille, Vescio, & Judd, 2000). Recent findings have demonstrated that social applicability, or stereotype match, also determines whether people in high-power roles stereotype those in low-power roles (Vescio, Gervais, Heidenreich, & Snyder, 2006; Vescio, Gervais, Snyder, & Hoover, 2005; Vescio, Snyder, & Butz, 2003).

The responsibilities associated with high-power roles in a given situation can also affect stereotyping tendencies. For instance, Overbeck and Park (2001) assigned people to positions that gave authority to and legitimated the influence they had over others (e.g., the power a professor has over a student, or legitimate power; French & Raven, 1959). After creating legitimate power differentials, high- and low-power participants engaged in apparent interactions with one another. In this context, Overbeck and Park found that powerful people more strongly individuated (rather than stereotyped) low-power others than low-power people individuated high-power others. These findings were consistent with the suggestion that high-power roles confer both authority and responsibility, and to

take responsibility and to do what is best for another one must attend to and be familiar with rather than stereotype the other.

VARIABILITY IN STEREOTYPING AS A FUNCTION OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

A host of individual differences have been shown to be associated with increases in stereotyping and prejudice. Consistent with the suggestion that dominance may be a predictor of both who secures power and how much one endorses stereotypic beliefs (e.g., Fiske, 1993), findings show that members of high-power, high-social-status groups (e.g., men and White Americans) are more in-group favoring (e.g., Jost, 2001) and more social dominance oriented (i.e., prefer inequality among social groups) than are members of low-power, low-social-status groups (e.g., women and African Americans; e.g., Pratto et al., 1994). Social dominance orientation is also positively associated with employment in occupations that enhance group-based inequality (e.g., Pratto, Stallworth, Sidanius, & Siers, 1997), endorsement of reproductive behaviors that maintain gender inequality (e.g., multiple partners, avoidance of child care; Pratto & Hegarty, 2000), and belief in social and political ideology that supports the group-based hierarchy (e.g., meritocracy; Pratto et al., 1994), as well as implicit and explicit indicators of racism (e.g., Pratto & Shih, 2000; Sidanius, Pratto & Bobo, 1996).

As noted earlier, power has been suggested to free people from constraints, such that high-power people may be more likely than low-power people to act in line with their internal dispositions (Keltner et al., 2003; Overbeck et al., 2006). Consistent with this notion, Chen et al. (2001) found that individual differences in relationship orientation moderated stereotyping tendencies among people primed to think of power. In other words, communally oriented (or other-focused) people were more equitable in their division of labor (or assignment of tasks to self vs. another) than were people who were exchange oriented (or self-focused). In addition, high-power people who were communally oriented and focused on the interests of others endorsed more socially appropriate (i.e., less racist) beliefs than high-power people who were exchange oriented and self-focused (Chen et al., 2001).

Importantly, the tendency for stereotypes to affect perceptions of and behavior toward others also varies as a function of differences in prejudice level. Findings point to meaningful differences in the content of high- and low-prejudice Whites' stereotypes of Blacks. The stereotypes held by both high- and low-prejudice Whites contain information about the relatively low social status of Black Americans (e.g., poor), but only the stereotypes held by high-prejudice Whites contain dispositional trait information (e.g., lazy; Vescio & Biernat, 1999; Wittenbrink & Henly, 1996). In addition, dispositional traits associated with the negative cultural stereotype of Blacks influence the judgments of high-prejudice (but not low-prejudice) Whites when racial category membership (e.g., "Black") is primed (Lepore & Brown, 1997). Thus, unlike high-prejudice Whites, low-prejudice Whites have not internalized the negative traits associated with Black Americans and the stereotypic traits of Black Americans are neither automatically activated nor influence judgments among low-prejudice Whites. Importantly, power seems to enhance these differences; for instance, findings show that racial biases in powerful people's evaluations and allocation of rewards to low-power Blacks are evident among Whites who are high in prejudice, but not low in prejudice (Vescio et al., 2006).

SUMMARY

The foregoing considerations highlight two important points. First, in many situations, stereotyping is stronger down than up the hierarchy (Fiske, 1993). Second, although high-power people often stereotype low-power people more than the reverse, stereotyping among the powerful is not ubiquitous. Various situational factors and individual differences moderate the relation between power and stereotyping (e.g., relationship orientation, Chen et al., 2001; focus on tasks vs. social responsibility, Overbeck & Park, 2001; prejudice level, Vescio et al., 2006).

A GOAL-SITUATED PERSPECTIVE ON POWER AND STEREOTYPING

In the remainder of this chapter we present theoretical propositions that integrate prior research and provide the basis for understanding both the causes and status quo maintaining consequences of the stereotypic actions of powerful people. Toward that end, we reiterate the situations of interest to our theorizing. We then note the characteristics of situations involving power differentials and consider the goals of high- and low-power people. Next, to refine and hone our consideration of the causes and consequences of the stereotypic acts of powerful people, we articulate three specific questions: (a) When do high-power people stereotype low-power people? (b) How do high-power people behave toward the low-power people they stereotype? and (c) What effects do the behaviors of high-power people have on the emotion, cognition, and performance of the low-power women and racial minorities who are stereotyped? Our answers to these questions provide the basis for several theoretical propositions. The core hypotheses and research relevant to these propositions are presented in the final portions of this section. These propositions provide a foundation for a goal-situated perspective on the relation between power and stereotyping.

DOMAINS OF INTEREST

We focus on traditionally valued achievement domains (STEM domains) because they are stereotype relevant. Women and ethnic minorities are stereotypically perceived as lacking attributes associated with success in STEM domains (e.g., rationality, logic). As a result, stereotypes may present a threat that can arouse anxiety and impede the performance of women and ethnic minorities (see Steele, 1997, 1998), contributing to persistent gender and racial disparities in representation, performance, and status in STEM domains.

We further narrow our focus to situations where low-power women and ethnic minorities are identified with STEM domains. These situations are important to understanding gender and ethnic disparities (Steele, 1997, 1998) but have received little theoretical and empirical attention in prior work on power and stereotyping. As a result, little is known about how powerful people perceive and behave toward low-power women and minority group members and how low-power women and minority group members respond to the behaviors of the powerful in such domains.

THE CORE HUMAN MOTIVES TO BELONG AND BE LEGITIMATE

As a starting point, we note that the need to belong is a core human motive (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). People deeply desire inclusion and want to belong, forming relationships with others quickly and easily (Brewer, 1979; Sherif, White, & Harvey, 1955) and experiencing distress when relationships dissolve (Hazan & Shaver, 1994). Conversely, social exclusion leads to threat and decreased self-esteem, control, and meaning (Williams, Shore, & Grahe, 1998). In fact, much of the meaning of people's lives derives from their relationships with groups, or social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

People are also motivated to see themselves as fair and principled. Principles of egalitarianism and equity are core to American ideology (e.g., Katz & Hass, 1988) and are endorsed cross-culturally (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz & Bardi, 2001). Findings also show that people genuinely value fairness, integrity, and rationality (e.g., Bierhoff, Cohen, & Greenberg, 1986; Folger, 1984; Greenberg & Cohen, 1982; Jost & Major, 2001; Lerner & Lerner, 1981).

GOAL-SHAPING FEATURES OF SITUATIONS INVOLVING DIFFERENTIALS IN ROLE POWER

The influences of the motives to belong and be legitimate (or fair and principled) in STEM contexts can be understood given a consideration of two important features of situations involving power differentials. First, there are clear objectives associated with these situations. People are awarded high-power roles (e.g., bosses, managers) because they are believed to be able to achieve the objectives

associated with positions of power. Second, there are interdependencies among people high and low in role power, such that the efforts and contributions of all people are required to achieve those objectives. Thus, to achieve desired objectives, high-power people must work with and effectively influence low-power people to make efforts and contributions that facilitate rather than impede collective attempts to achieve desired outcomes. Simply stated, if the contributions of low-power people were not needed to secure desired outcomes, there would be no people assigned to those roles in a given context. A coach, for example, is hired to produce a winning season and to do so he or she must inspire winning performances from team members.

The Goals of High-Power People

Together, the foregoing considerations suggest that high-power people internalize the goals of their positions and are motivated to effectively and legitimately work with low-power people. In other words, we assume that people who accept high-power positions internalize the goals associated with those positions because doing so ensures belonging in a given context. In addition, like people in general, high-power people are motivated to effectively pursue their goals and to do so in legitimate, fair, and principled ways. Because the goals of high- and low-power people are interdependent, powerful people's desires to be effective and legitimate should become intertwined. To be effective, high-power people must attend to the goal-relevant skills, attributes, and abilities of the low-power people while ignoring goal-irrelevant characteristics. This suggestion is consistent with findings showing that high- (vs. low-) power people more quickly set and act on goals (Guinote, 2007a), are better able to inhibit goal-irrelevant information (Guinote, 2007b), and are more motivated and better able to process goal-related information about inconsistent others (Chen, Ybarra, & Kiefer, 2004). To be legitimate, high-power people must effectively pursue goals in ways that they perceive to be fair, unbiased, and principled.

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The Goals of Low-Power People

Paralleling and complementing the goals of high-power people, low-power people who are domain identified also seek to belong. Desires to belong may, in fact, be higher for those low (compared to high) in power. People differ in the degree that they are prototypic members of in-groups (Tajfel, 1982). Those who embody the characteristics of a valued group or domain tend to be included and have more power, whereas those who less thoroughly embody the valued characteristics tend to be excluded and have less power (Emerson, 1964). As Tajfel (1978) noted, less prototypic, low-power people "constantly face the danger of being unmasked" (p. 15) and rejected by high-power people. In an effort to increase belongingness, low-power people should be motivated to effectively and legitimately perform the tasks that they are assigned by high-power people. Consistent with this notion, findings show that peripheral, low-power people (e.g., individuals who belong to groups that are negatively stereotyped) feel more belonging uncertainty than do higher power people (Walton & Cohen, 2007). In addition, because STEM domains are widely perceived to be meritocracies, low-power people may strive to appease belonging uncertainty by successfully completing tasks that contribute to the objectives valued in a particular domain (and powerful people's goals). This shows that they possess the attributes valued in a given domain and indicative of belonging.

WHEN DO HIGH-POWER PEOPLE STEREOTYPE LOW-POWER PEOPLE?

If powerful people are motivated to effectively and legitimately work with low-power people, then stereotyping should only occur when it slips by undetected. In other words, stereotyping should ensue when it seems effective and fair. Later we note when the processes of categorization and stereotyping come together in situations involving differentials in role power to permit the stereotyping tendencies of powerful people to slip by undetected.

The situations associated with STEM domains set the stage for the stereotyping of low-power women and ethnic minorities. As we have noted, there are gender and ethnic disparities in

representation and status, such that White men are the normative people in STEM domains, similar to Western cultures more generally (Zarate & Smith, 1990). Importantly, nonnormative group memberships are attention-grabbing and provide a basis of categorization (e.g., race, gender, age; Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Women typically are categorized on the basis of their nonnormative gender and ethnic minority men are categorized on the basis of their nonnormative race; White men are not, however, immediately categorized (Zarate & Smith, 1990; see also Stroessner, 1996). Categorization is a necessary precondition of stereotyping, and cultural stereotypes contain information that implies that women and ethnic minorities have critical shortcomings that may impede success in STEM domains (e.g., emotional, illogical). In other words, stereotypes may provide information that is relevant to the goals of powerful people in STEM domains.

Stereotype-relevant STEM domains provide the necessary preconditions of stereotyping, but they do not provide sufficient conditions that assure stereotyping. Instead, once the situational preconditions of stereotyping are present, the tendencies of high-power people vary as a function of stereotype endorsement and how goal strivings are construed, as we note later.

The stereotyping tendencies of high-power people vary across and within groups as a function of the degree to which people endorse the cultural stereotypes of the groups to which low-power people belong. For instance, men and women differ in their endorsement of sexist ideologies and stereotypes. Men more strongly endorse both hostile and benevolent sexist attitudes (Glick & Fiske, 2001), view women as possessing fewer agentic traits (Diekmann & Eagly, 2000; Spence & Buckner, 2000), and have less complex representations of women (Park & Judd, 1990) than do women. As noted earlier, findings from the prejudice literature also show that those who endorse stereotypes (e.g., high-prejudice people) have stronger links between the content of stereotypic representations and category labels (Lepore & Brown, 1997) and are less motivated to temper prejudiced responding (Plant & Devine, 1998) than people who reject stereotypes (e.g., low-prejudice people). Together, these findings suggest that those who endorse (vs. reject) negative stereotypes should more readily and frequently use stereotypes to make judgments about women and racial minorities. Consistent with this suggestion, findings show that in achievement domains powerful men (but not women) stereotype low-power women (Vescio et al., 2003), and powerful Whites who are high (but not low) in prejudice stereotype low-power Blacks (Vescio et al., 2006).

The stereotyping tendencies of powerful people also vary as a function of their *social influence strategies*, or plans about how to achieve goals that require the contributions of low-power people (Vescio et al., 2006; Vescio et al., 2005; Vescio et al., 2003). Social influence strategies can be manipulated across situations to take one of two forms. *Weakness-focused* social influence strategies are based on beliefs about how subordinates may impede goal strivings. As such, they are characterized by a heightened attention to contextually relevant weaknesses that low-power people possess and how those weaknesses impede goal strivings. *Strength-focused* social influence strategies are beliefs about how low-power people may enhance goal strivings. As a result, they are characterized by a heightened attention to contextually relevant strengths that low-power people possess and how those strengths enhance goal strivings.¹

¹ Our distinction between strength- versus weakness-focused social influence has some similarities to Higgins's (1997) articulation of promotion versus prevention self-regulatory focus. Like a promotion self-regulatory focus, strength-focused social influence strategies emphasize approach-related behavior and a heightened sensitivity to positive outcomes, and like a prevention self-regulatory focus, weakness-focused social influence strategies emphasize avoidance-related behavior and a heightened sensitivity to negative outcomes. However, Higgins's work dealt with the question of how people regulate their own goal-related activities and responses in light of salient self-images (e.g., "ideal" vs. "ought" self), whereas social influence strategies refer to how powerful people regulate interactions with others to promote or prevent particular subordinate outcomes. Additionally, we make no assumptions about self-involvement or self-focus of people in positions of power; strength-focused social influence strategies are not uniquely associated with the ideal self, nor are weakness-focused social influence strategies associated with the "ought self." For example, a powerful person may envision personal goals given reference to one's ideal self, positive outcomes, and a promotion focus but may adopt a weakness-focused social influence strategy (e.g., when subordinates are inexperienced).

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Research from our lab shows that powerful people stereotype low-power people when the content of the cultural stereotypes of the groups to which low-power people belong matches and informs the social influence strategies powerful people have adopted. In STEM domains, cultural stereotypes of women and ethnic minorities match weakness-focused social influence strategies. In their efforts to secure goals, powerful people who are weakness focused seek to minimize impediments to goal strivings. As a result, they are attentive to and seek information about others that allows them to withhold valued tasks from those who lack the requisite skills. Cultural stereotypes of women and ethnic minorities match and inform weakness-focused social influence strategies. Stereotypes suggest that women and ethnic minorities have critical shortcomings that may compromise goal attainment (e.g., women are emotional, illogical and weak; African Americans are unintelligent and unmotivated), providing information of relevance. Thus, stereotypes of women and ethnic minorities match weakness-focused social influence strategies and stereotyping should ensue.

By contrast, stereotypes of women and ethnic minorities are mismatched with strength-focused social influence strategies in STEM domains. To enhance goal strivings, powerful people who are strength-focused seek information about others that allows them to assign valued tasks to those possessing requisite skills. Cultural stereotypes point to the strengths that women and ethnic minorities possess (e.g., women are caring and nurturing; African Americans are musical and athletic), but those strengths are irrelevant to goal strivings in STEM domains. As a result, stereotypes do not match strength-focused goal strivings and stereotyping should not ensue.

Together, the foregoing considerations provide the basis for predictions regarding when powerful people will stereotype low-power women and ethnic minorities in STEM domains. We predict that powerful people will stereotype low-power women and ethnic minorities when stereotypes of those groups (a) are endorsed by powerful people, and (b) match powerful people's social influence strategies. As noted, there are also variations in stereotype endorsement, between-group and within-group variations, such that stereotyping tendencies should be stronger among powerful men (vs. women) and powerful Whites who are high (vs. low) in prejudice. In addition, in STEM domains, stereotypes match weakness-focused social influence strategies.

Thus, powerful men (but not women) should stereotype low-power women in STEM domains and powerful Whites who are high (vs. low) in prejudice should stereotype low-power Blacks. Consistent with these suggestions, in STEM domains, across studies we have found that powerful men who were weakness-focused more strongly categorized low-power people according to gender and showed stronger antifemale biases in evaluations and the allocation of valued resources than did powerful men who were strength-focused and powerful women (regardless of social influence strategy; Vescio et al., 2005; Vescio et al., 2003). In academic domains, findings also showed that powerful Whites who were weakness-focused more negatively evaluated and allocated fewer valued resources to low-power Blacks than did powerful Whites who were strength-focused (Vescio et al., 2006).

HOW DO HIGH-POWER PEOPLE BEHAVE TOWARD THE LOW-POWER PEOPLE THEY STEREOTYPE?

If powerful people are motivated to effectively and legitimately work with low-power people such that stereotyping only occurs when it slips by undetected, then the stereotypic actions of powerful people must be more subtle and nuanced than typically thought. More specifically, people feel guilty and self-critical when confronted with evidence that their thoughts or behaviors have violated ideals of fairness (Czopp & Monteith, 2003; Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith & Mark, 2005; Zuwerink, Devine, Monteith, & Cook, 1996; see also Winslow, 2004). As a result, most people are motivated (intrinsically, extrinsically, or both) to monitor and control their responses to avoid imputations of prejudice (from the self or others; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002). Presenting difficulty, however, is the fact that prejudicial acts are prototypically perceived to be hostile and direct (e.g., Inman & Baron, 1996; Inman, Huerta, & Oh, 1998). The implication is that attempts to monitor one's own behavior may be effective in limited

contexts; namely, those in which one's behavior resembles what is prototypically perceived to be prejudice—blatant and hostile acts.

Gender-based and race-based inequities are, however, most typically and effectively maintained through the relatively more subtle and sweet persuasive influences of paternalism than through overt acts of hostility and disrespect (Jackman, 1994; Pratto & Walker, 2001). Like the all-knowing authoritarian father who makes decisions on behalf of others (e.g., his children) out of a belief that he is doing what is best for those over whom he has power, heterosexual relations are characterized by rituals and norms that involve men taking care of and protecting their women. Men are providers and protectors, with the assumption being that those they care for cannot provide for and protect themselves. As providers and protectors, men may act in ways that seem kind and derive from their seemingly sincere regard for women. Historically, race relations were characterized by similar paternalistic relations, whereby one group of people owned another to provide care for those whom they perceived to lack the capacity for self-care. As Jackman noted, however, the seemingly benign acts that derive from a sincere feeling of positive regard (e.g., praising, limiting activity for the welfare of others) may lubricate intergroup relations such that group-based inequities are concealed, reinforced, and maintained.

The notion that benevolence, or feelings of sincere positive regard, may coexist with deep-seated antipathy to mask group-based inequities is an implicit aspect of several theories of racial prejudice. Both aversive and ambivalent racism theories (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Katz & Hass, 1988), for instance, posit that most White Americans endorse egalitarian values and are aware of the past injustices perpetrated against Black Americans. Egalitarian values and knowledge of the negative historical treatment of Black Americans presumably combine to produce a sincere positive regard for Black Americans. As a result, White Americans tend to discriminate against Black Americans only when there are clear situational justifications for negative behavior, such that racism is typically associated with attributional ambiguity.

Contemporary theories of gender stereotyping and sexism have also incorporated and extended the notion that group-based inequities are maintained through subtle acts of benevolence and paternalism, rather than overt hostility. Benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001), for example, is characterized by beliefs of complementary gender roles (where communal female and agentic male partners create a whole), paternalism, and intimate heterosexual relations (e.g., sweet communal women adored and put on a pedestal). Although apparently positive, benevolently sexist beliefs are based on stereotypes that women are incompetent and childlike. Research testing the model of (often mixed) stereotype content (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) reveals that women, like the elderly and people with disabilities, are stereotyped as warm but incompetent. Perhaps not surprising given the content, stereotypes of traditional women elicit pity and benevolently sexist acts of condescension rather than respect. Likewise, social role theory (Eagly, 1987) notes that women are sometimes evaluated positively (even more positively than men). Women are adored, put on a pedestal, and flattered when appropriately communal and warm (e.g., the women are wonderful effect; Eagly & Mladinic, 1989), but punished and socially excluded when they are gender role violating and agentic (Rudman & Fairchild, 2004; Rudman & Glick, 1999, 2001). Importantly, however, even when women are adored and thought to be wonderfully gender appropriate, others' seemingly sweet acts of kindness are patronizing and insincere (Glick & Fiske, 2001); such acts imply women's inferiority.

What do the stereotypic and patronizing acts of benevolence look like? Our answer to this question focuses on gender stereotyping. In our initial theorizing and the research testing our hypotheses, we focused on gender stereotyping and sexism. We will, however, generalize our theory and findings to consider the implications for racial stereotyping in the general discussion.

Patronizing behavior is a pattern of group-based inequity that is masked by trivial niceties (Vescio et al., 2005). More specifically, as Biernat and Vescio (2002) noted, patronizing behavior is characterized by a pattern of behaviors whereby women receive fewer valued resources than White men (e.g., raises, promotions), but more condescending flattery (e.g., praise, pats on the back). As noted earlier, traditional women are stereotyped as warm but incompetent (Fiske et al., 2002). The

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conflicting stereotype content may promote distinct kinds of behaviors from men. In masculine domains, stereotypes of women as warm and communal may promote positive verbal and nonverbal behaviors, like praise, encouragement, and pats on the back. By contrast, women's stereotypic incompetence may simultaneously inspire gender inequity in the allocation of valued resources, like raises and promotions (Vescio et al., 2005; see also Glick & Fiske, 2001). Thus, when powerful men stereotype low-power women, patronizing behavior may result, such that there are antifemale biases in the allocation of valued resources and profemale biases on praise.

Two findings from our lab support predictions. First, powerful men who were weakness-focused more strongly categorized their subordinates according to gender than did powerful men who were strength-focused (see Vescio et al., 2005; Vescio et al., 2003). Second, among powerful men who were weakness-focused, categorization was strongly correlated with patronizing behavior—including devalued position assignments and increased praise for women.

Ironically, although praise may mask gender inequities in the allocation of valued resources, powerful men who behaved in benevolently sexist ways perceive that their praise has stemmed from genuine and positive sentimentality toward women. Thus, as Jackman (1994) noted, subtle acts of sexism, like patronizing behavior, may not be viewed as sexist by male actors. Thus, powerful men can maintain goals of being effective and legitimate by behaving in patronizing ways. Patronizing behavior may, however, be keenly experienced as unfair by those who are patronized. Next we turn attention to the perspective of low-power people who are recipients of subtle prejudice.

HOW DO THE STEREOTYPIC AND PATRONIZING BEHAVIORS OF THE POWERFUL AFFECT THEIR LOW-POWER RECIPIENTS?

It is reasonable to expect that low-power people will be angered by the patronizing behaviors of those who have power over them. At minimum, patronizing behavior is duplicitous; one's apparently praiseworthy inputs are not met with equally valuable outputs. Importantly, anger is the emotion typically reported in response to perceptions of injustice (Mikula, 1986; Mikula, Scherer & Athenstaedt, 1998; Miller, 2001). Anger follows from perceptions that another person has committed a transgression against oneself (e.g., social rejection; Leary, Twenge, & Quinlivan, 2006) and that one has the coping mechanisms to fix the anger-inspiring situation (Lazarus, 1991).

Anger is also an approach-related emotion associated with the behavioral approach system (BAS; Harmon-Jones & Sigelman, 2001), which is the motivational system that activates approach behaviors in response to desired environmental stimuli (Gray, 1982, 1987). Importantly, however, when there are no actions that could ameliorate an anger-inspiring situation, irksome feelings persist while people remain in the anger-inspiring situation, but those feelings no longer inspire action (i.e., anger is no longer associated with asymmetric left midfrontal cortical activity, neural activity indicative of BAS; Harmon-Jones, Sigelman, Bohlig, & Harmon-Jones, 2003). In other words, anger can trigger and maintain sudden, direct, and focused bursts of attention and action (Sternberg & Campos, 1990), but only when people perceive control or think that their actions can fix the situation.

Low-power men and women who are treated in patronizing ways may experience anger because such behaviors seem unfair, but low-power men and women may differ in their behavioral expression of anger and perceptions of control. For instance, although men and women report anger at similar frequencies and intensities (Fischer, Rodriguez, Mosquera, van Vianen, & Manstead, 2004; Kopper & Epperson, 1991; Thomas, 1989), angry outbursts violate feminine gender roles, and there are social sanctions for gender-role violations (Rudman & Fairchild, 2004; Rudman & Glick, 1999, 2001). As a result, women may attempt to suppress behavioral expressions of anger, which is consistent with findings showing gender differences in the tendency to act on anger (for a review, see Shields, 2002). In addition, in STEM domains, women also have lower expectations for positive outcomes, less confidence, fewer perceptions of personal control, and worse performance relative

to men (Meece, Parsons, Kaczala, & Goff, 1982; Parsons, Kaczala, & Meece, 1982; Ryckman & Peckham, 1987; Stipek, 1984).

We suggest that gender differences in the behavioral expression of anger may work together with gender differences in confidence and performance expectations in STEM domains to affect performance. Given our conceptualization of patronizing behavior (i.e., assigning devalued position but much praise), one may ameliorate anger by attempting to improve performance to assure belonging and avoid future patronization (if effort is associated with performance). In addition, as noted earlier, low-power people may strive to belong in valued STEM domains by successfully completing tasks that contribute to the objectives valued in a particular domain (and powerful people's goals). If women are less likely than men to be confident about their abilities in STEM domains and less likely to act on the basis of anger, then gender differences in performance should emerge.

To test the notion that the patronizing behaviors of high-power people create gender differences in performance among the relatively powerless where they would not otherwise exist, we have conducted several studies. In each, participants were assigned to low-power positions and received patronizing feedback from a male leader in a stereotypically masculine domain. To create patronizing feedback and appropriate comparison conditions, praise (high or low) and a position assignment (valued or devalued) were crossed. After receiving feedback and task assignments, people reported perceptions of control and anger. They also completed standardized logic and math problems in each of two rounds.

Three critical patterns of findings emerged across studies. First, in the patronizing conditions (devalued positions–high praise), both men and women reported more anger than in other conditions (Vescio et al., 2005, Study 2). Second, despite the fact that men and women were similarly angered as targets of patronizing behavior, there were gender differences in performance; women performed less well than did men in only one condition—the patronizing condition. In fact, women in the patronizing condition performed worse than women in other conditions, including women who received devalued positions but were not praised. By contrast, men in the patronizing condition performed better than men in the other three conditions.

Third, findings are consistent with the notion that, in patronizing conditions, gender differences in perceived control cause gender differences in performance. Gervais and Vescio (2007) conducted a series of studies that point to the import of perceptions of control. Findings show that, for instance, after being patronized by a powerful person, low-power men perceive that they have more control over their future ability to acquire such a position than do women. In addition, when control is manipulated (high control, low control, or ambiguous), gender differences in performance predictably vary. When performance is severed from outcomes, such that no participants (male or female) believe that their actions can fix the anger-inspiring situation, men underperform like women. By contrast, when perceptions of control are uniformly heightened (for women and men), gender differences in performance were no longer significant because women in the high-control condition perform as well as men.

SUMMARY OF ASSUMPTIONS AND PROPOSITIONS

In the proceeding sections, we noted that the desires to belong and be legitimate are basic motives that are shaped by role power to determine high- and low-power people's goals. The *foundational assumptions* on which our prior and ongoing theory and research have been based are twofold. First, we assume that high-power people internalize the goals of their positions and are motivated to effectively and legitimately work with low-power people to achieve those goals. Second, we assume that low-power people are motivated to effectively and legitimately perform tasks that are valued in a given domain in an effort to increase or secure belonging.

Given these assumptions, the theory and research presented in this chapter addressed when, how, and with what consequences high-power people stereotype and discriminate against low-power women and minorities in STEM domains. We presented three propositions that, together, address

this broad issue. The first two propositions address when high-power people stereotype low-power people and how they behave toward the low-power people they stereotype.

Proposition I: High-power people stereotype low-power people when the stereotypes of the group to which low-power people belong:

- are contextually relevant (e.g., gender and race stereotypes in STEM domains).
- are endorsed by powerful people (e.g., seen as factual and therefore legitimate).
- match powerful social influence strategies (e.g., effectively inform the situation).

Stereotyping lays the foundation for discriminatory behaviors, which we suggest are more subtle and nuanced than originally thought.

Proposition II: The stereotypic acts of powerful people are often comprised of seemingly well-intentioned acts (like praise) that mask group-based inequities in the allocation of valued resources (e.g., raises, promotions).

From the perspective of high-power people, the niceties are believed to stem from sincere positive regard. From the perspective of low-power people, however, the behaviors of the powerful seem duplicitous and unfair. This leads to the final proposition, which addresses the question of the consequences that the stereotypic behaviors of high-power people have for their low-power recipients.

Proposition III: Low-power people who are the targets of the stereotypic acts of powerful people typically will be angered by the duplicity of such behaviors. Anger should inspire effort and corrective actions when personal control is high, such that low-power people see acts that could ameliorate the adversity. If personal control is low, such that one fails to see potentially corrective actions, then effort should be withdrawn.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The foundational assumptions and ideas presented in Propositions I, II, and III represent a goal-situated perspective on the relation between power and stereotyping. At the heart of this perspective is the basic notion that the behaviors of high-power and low-power people can be understood given consideration of the way in which situations shape the expression of people's motives to belong and be legitimate. The propositions described note when high-power people stereotype low-power people and we consider these to be general theoretical statements. In other words, these are statements that are expected to apply to predictions about when low-power people from different social groups are stereotyped, as well as predictions that would be expected to predict stereotyping effects across diverse contexts. In this chapter, we focused on STEM domains and the relevance of stereotypes of women and ethnic minority groups to those domains. We would, however, expect similar patterns of effects when low-power people belong to other negatively stereotyped groups (e.g., Latinos, elderly).

Interestingly, in achievement domains, the groups that are negatively stereotyped are those groups stereotypically defined as incompetent. As Fiske and her colleagues (2002) noted, many groups are stereotypically perceived as incompetent but warm (e.g., traditional women, elderly people, and even entertaining but incompetent Black comedians and athletes). These groups are also the groups that are pitied and treated in paternalistic ways. Members of these pitied groups may be particularly like to be stereotyped in sugar-coated ways, such that trivial niceties (e.g., praise) mask underlying group-based inequities. There are, however, other negatively stereotyped groups that are stereotypically perceived to be competent but cold and cunning (e.g., feminist, Jewish people). These groups are respected for their capabilities, but disliked because of their lack of warmth. Members of these groups may be stereotyped in different contexts (e.g., caretaking situations) or subject to social inci-

vilities rather than professional marginalization. Our ongoing work continues to test the predictions of our goal-situated perspective across target groups and contexts.

Regardless of the breadth of the statements outlined, our analysis is built on a dynamic social influence conceptualization of power. The propositions noted and the findings supporting the predictions demonstrate both the stereotypic tendencies of high-power people and their emotional and performance consequences for low-power people. As a result, our theory and research has pointed to important mechanisms that, together, contribute to gender disparities and racial disparities in achievement domains—anger and perceived control among the relatively powerless.

Our work has also pointed to a host of situational factors that can be altered to temper the status quo maintaining links between power and stereotyping. In particular, our theory and research point to factors that prevent the stereotyping of the powerful (e.g., situational manipulations of social influence strategies). Our theory and research also point to factors that can be altered such that low-power people's perceptions of their personal ability to control, or fix, an adverse situation are enhanced, such that anger leads to increased effort and improved performance rather than performance decrements. In sum, our theory and research point to tangible, efficient, and potential low-cost interventions that may temper the stereotyping among the powerful or increase perceptions of control among the relatively powerless, thereby minimizing the underperformance of women and ethnicity minorities in achievement domains.

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